We generalize the disutility of effort function in the linear-Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) pure moral hazard model. We assume that agents are heterogeneous in ability. Each agent’s ability is observable and treated as a parameter that indexes the disutility of effort associated with the task performed. In opposition to the literature (the “traditional” scenario), we find a new, “novel” scenario, in which a high-ability agent may be offered a weaker incentive contract than a low-ability one, but works harder. We characterize the conditions for the existence of these two scenarios: formally, the “traditional” (“novel”) scenario occurs if and only if the marginal rate of substitution of the marginal disutility of effort function is increasing (decreasing) in effort when evaluated at the second-best effort. If, further, this condition holds for all parameter values and matching is endogenous, less (more) talented agents work for principals with riskier projects in equilibrium. This implies that the indirect and total effects of risk on incentives are negative under monotone assortative matching.

我们概括了线性恒定绝对风险厌恶 (CARA) 纯道德风险模型中努力函数的无效性。我们假设代理的能力是异质的。每个代理的能力都是可观察的，并被视为一个参数，该参数对与所执行任务相关的努力的无效性进行索引。与文献（“传统”情景）相反，我们发现了一种新的“新颖”情景，在这种情景中，高能力代理可能会获得比低能力代理更弱的激励合同，但工作更努力。我们描述了这两种情景存在的条件：形式上，“传统”（“新颖”）情景发生当且仅当在评估时努力的边际效用函数的边际替代率增加（减少）尽其所能。如果进一步，这种条件适用于所有参数值，并且匹配是内生的，较少（较多）才华横溢的代理人为具有较高风险项目的委托人工作。这意味着在单调分类匹配下，风险对激励的间接和总体影响是负面的。