Working with the assumption that properties depend for their instantiation on substances, I argue against a unitary analysis of instantiation. On the standard view, a property is instantiated just in case there is a substance that serves as the bearer of the property. But this view cannot make sense of how properties that are mind-dependent depend for their instantiation on minds. I consider two classes of properties that philosophers often take to be mind-dependent: sensible qualities like color and bodily sensations like itches. Given that the mind is never itself literally red or itchy, we cannot explain the instantiation of these qualities as a matter of their having a mental bearer. Appealing to insights from Berkeley, I defend a view on which a property can be instantiated not in virtue of having a bearer—mental or material—but rather in virtue of being the object of a conscious act of perception. In the second half of the paper, I suggest that the best account of sensible qualities and bodily sensations ultimately makes use of both varieties of instantiation.

中文翻译：

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实例化的多样性

假设属性依赖于实体的实例化，我反对对实例化进行单一分析。在标准视图中，属性会被实例化，以防万一存在充当属性承载者的实体。但是这种观点无法理解这些属性是如何存在的依赖心智取决于他们对头脑的实例化。我认为哲学家通常认为与心灵相关的两类属性：颜色等可感知的品质和瘙痒等身体感觉。鉴于头脑本身从来不是字面上的红色或发痒，我们不能将这些品质的实例化解释为它们具有精神承载者的问题。诉诸伯克利的见解，我捍卫这样一种观点，即属性可以实例化不是凭借拥有一个载体——精神上的或物质上的——而是凭借成为有意识的感知行为的对象。在论文的后半部分，我建议对感官品质和身体感觉的最佳描述最终会使用这两种实例化。