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Electoral Competition with Rationally Inattentive Voters
Journal of the European Economic Association ( IF 4.301 ) Pub Date : 2020-09-23 , DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvaa042 Filip Matějka 1 , Guido Tabellini 2
Journal of the European Economic Association ( IF 4.301 ) Pub Date : 2020-09-23 , DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvaa042 Filip Matějka 1 , Guido Tabellini 2
Affiliation
This paper studies how voters’ selective ignorance interacts with policy design by political candidates. It shows that the selectivity empowers voters with extreme preferences and small groups, that divisive issues attract most attention, and that public goods are underfunded. Finer granularity of information increases these inefficiencies. Rational inattention can also explain why competing opportunistic candidates do not always converge on the same policy issues.
中文翻译:
与理性疏忽的选民的选举竞争
本文研究选民的选择性无知如何与政治候选人的政策设计相互作用。它表明选择性赋予具有极端偏好和小团体的选民权力,分裂问题最受关注,公共物品资金不足。更细粒度的信息会增加这些低效率。理性的疏忽也可以解释为什么相互竞争的机会主义候选人并不总是集中在相同的政策问题上。
更新日期:2020-09-23
中文翻译:
与理性疏忽的选民的选举竞争
本文研究选民的选择性无知如何与政治候选人的政策设计相互作用。它表明选择性赋予具有极端偏好和小团体的选民权力,分裂问题最受关注,公共物品资金不足。更细粒度的信息会增加这些低效率。理性的疏忽也可以解释为什么相互竞争的机会主义候选人并不总是集中在相同的政策问题上。