This paper analyzes climate policy (in the form of emissions caps) in a multi-country game when consumers have preferences with different degrees of morality. In the absence of climate policy, the larger the consumers’ degree of morality, the lower the energy consumption and climate damage. Moral consumer-voters elect either emissions caps (direct democracy) under majority rule, or policymakers who then choose emissions caps (representative democracy). If voters take prices as given, then election-winning emissions caps are tighter, the lower the median voters’ degree of morality. If voters seek to influence prices in their favor, then strong strategic price effects are generated and the election-winning emissions caps are less stringent, the lower the median voters’ degree of morality. We also show that the morality of election-winning policymakers differs from the morality of median voters. It is possible that a moral median voter elects a policymaker with zero morality who then implements an emissions cap that might be larger than emissions in the absence of climate policy.

中文翻译：

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气候政策和道德消费者*

本文分析了消费者具有不同道德程度偏好时的多国博弈中的气候政策（以排放上限的形式）。在没有气候政策的情况下，消费者的道德水平越高，能源消耗和气候破坏就越小。道德的消费者选民要么在多数人统治下选择排放上限（直接民主），要么选择然后选择排放上限（代议制民主）的政策制定者。如果选民按照给定，选举获胜的排放帽是更加紧张的，中位数的道德程度越低。如果选民试图影响价格的青睐，那么产生强大的战略价格影响，选举获胜的排放帽的严格严格较小，中位数的民主党的道德程度越低。我们还表明，选举获胜的政策制定者的道德与中位数选民的道德不同。道德中位数的选民有可能选出一个道德为零的政策制定者，然后他实施的排放上限可能大于没有气候政策的排放量。