We examine the effect of technology spillovers on the duration of executive compensation contracts. We find that in the presence of greater technology spillovers, firms tend to grant longer duration compensation contracts to their executives. This finding is consistent with theoretical predictions by Manso (2011) who argues that firms should choose longer-term contracts to encourage managerial incentives for exploration. We enhance our identification by using exogenous variation in state-level R&D tax credits of peer firms to identify the effect of technology spillovers on the duration of focal firm compensation structures. We also find this effect to be stronger among younger firms and firms with more growth opportunities. Overall, our findings suggest that technology spillover has a meaningful influence on compensation contracting.

我们研究了技术溢出对高管薪酬合同期限的影响。我们发现，在存在更大的技术溢出效应的情况下，公司倾向于向其高管授予期限更长的薪酬合同。这一发现与 Manso (2011) 的理论预测一致，他认为公司应该选择长期合同来鼓励管理层对勘探的激励。我们通过使用同行公司的州级研发税收抵免的外生变化来识别技术溢出对焦点公司薪酬结构持续时间的影响，从而增强我们的识别能力。我们还发现，这种效应在较年轻的公司和拥有更多增长机会的公司中更为明显。总体而言，我们的研究结果表明，技术溢出对补偿合同具有重要影响。