Fishery rents may be dissipated across margins not well defined or controlled by an individual transferable quota system. Collective rights–based fishery management (CRBFM), where catch rights are held by a group, can sometimes generate greater benefits and can also address external impacts of the fishery. I discuss potential failures of individual quotas and how these problems were addressed by CRBFM institutions. I then focus on the role of CRBFM in addressing environmental and social impacts external to the group of fishers, such as bycatch, habitat impacts, and spatial conflicts. The review suggests that CRBFM can effectively address both intrafishery and external impacts, provided there is sufficient incentive to do so, including maintaining access to preferred markets or the threat of further regulation. However, CRBFM can create moral hazard and adverse selection problems, and successful CRBFM institutions generally have homogeneous membership with well-aligned interests and/or formal contracts wit...

中文翻译：

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基于集体权利的渔业管理：通往基于生态系统的渔业管理之路

渔业租金可能会在未由个人可转让配额系统明确定义或控制的边际上消散。基于集体权利的渔业管理（CRBFM），捕捞权由一个群体持有，有时可以产生更大的收益，也可以解决渔业的外部影响。我讨论了个人配额的潜在失败以及 CRBFM 机构如何解决这些问题。然后，我将重点介绍 CRBFM 在解决渔民群体外部的环境和社会影响方面的作用，例如兼捕、栖息地影响和空间冲突。审查表明，CRBFM 可以有效地解决渔业内部和外部影响，前提是有足够的动力这样做，包括保持进入首选市场的机会或进一步监管的威胁。然而，