This paper studies the optimal design of dynamic research contests. We introduce interim transfers, which are paid in every period while the contest is ongoing, to an otherwise standard setting. We show that a contest where: (i) the principal can stop the contest in any period, (ii) a constant interim transfer is paid to agents in each period while the contest is ongoing, and (iii) a final prize is paid once the principal stops the contest, is optimal for the principal and implements the first-best.

中文翻译：

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设计动态研究竞赛

本文研究了动态研究竞赛的优化设计。我们在其他标准设置中引入了在比赛进行期间在每个时期支付的临时转账。我们证明了一场比赛：（i）委托人可以在任何时期停止比赛，（ii）在比赛进行的每个时期向代理人支付持续的临时转账，以及（iii）一次支付最终奖金校长停止比赛，对校长来说是最优的，并执行最好的。