I study a sequential search model where buyers face an unknown distribution of offers and learn about the distribution from other buyers' actions. Each buyer observes whether a randomly chosen buyer traded in the previous period. I show that a cyclical equilibrium exists where the informational content of observing a trade uctuates: a trade is good news about the distribution in every other period and bad news in the remaining periods. This leads to uctuations in the volume and probability of trading. They uctuate more if the unknown distribution is bad rather than good. A steady-state equilibrium where buyers are more likely to continue searching than in the cyclical equilibrium is less ecient than the cyclical equilibrium. A market that starts at date one converges to the cyclical equilibrium for some parameter values.

中文翻译：

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搜索市场中的信息周期

我研究了一个顺序搜索模型，其中买家面临未知的报价分布，并从其他买家的行为中了解分布。每个买家观察随机选择的买家是否在前一时期进行了交易。我表明，在观察交易的信息内容波动的地方存在周期性均衡：交易是关于每隔一段时间的分布的好消息，而在其余时间段则是坏消息。这导致交易量和交易概率的波动。如果未知分布是坏的而不是好的，则它们的波动更大。与周期性均衡相比，买家更有可能继续寻找的稳态均衡不如周期性均衡有效。对于某些参数值，从第一天开始的市场会收敛到周期性均衡。