当前位置: X-MOL 学术American Economic Journal: Microeconomics › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
History-Bound Reelections
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics ( IF 2.458 ) Pub Date : 2020-08-01 , DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170102
Hans Gersbach 1
Affiliation  

Often political races are not really competitive, and the path to reelection is smooth for many incumbents. In two-candidate races for office we suggest the introduction of a new re-election rule, which we call the “Score-replication Rule.” This rule requires that, to be reelected, any incumbent has to obtain a percentage of votes that is at least as high as the highest vote-share he/she obtained in any previous election (reduced by some margin). Such a delimiter would restrain negative “incumbency advantages,” and render reelection competitive again. It could also reduce polarization in the United States Congress. Moreover, we suggest how history-bound reelections could be used in European-style proportional election systems.

中文翻译:

受历史约束的连任

政治种族通常没有真正的竞争力,对于许多现任者来说,连任之路是平坦的。在两个候选人的竞选中,我们建议引入新的连任规则,我们称之为“分数复制规则”。该规则要求重新选择,任何现任者必须获得至少高度的投票百分比,这些投票是他/她在任何之前的选举中获得的最高投票(减少了一些边际)。这样的分隔符将抑制负面的“在职优势”,并使连任再次具有竞争力。它还可以减少美国国会的两极分化。此外,我们建议如何在欧洲风格的比例选举制度中使用受历史约束的连任。
更新日期:2020-08-01
down
wechat
bug