We study competition for the market in a dynamic model with network externalities, focusing on the efficiency of market outcomes. We propose a representation of the strategic advantages of incumbency and embed it in a dynamic framework with heterogeneous consumers. Then, we completely identify the conditions under which inefficient equilibria with several platforms emerge at equilibrium; explore the reasons why these inefficient equilibria arise; and compute the value of incumbency and analyze why static models generally exaggerate it.

中文翻译：

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当平台面对异构客户时，在职的价值

我们在具有网络外部性的动态模型中研究市场竞争，重点关注市场结果的效率。我们提出了在职战略优势的表示，并将其嵌入到具有异构消费者的动态框架中。然后，我们完全确定了几个平台的低效均衡出现的条件；探究这些低效均衡出现的原因；并计算在职率的值并分析为什么静态模型通常会夸大它。