Procurement regulation aimed at curbing discrimination requires equal treatment of sellers. However, Deb and Pai (2017) show that such regulation imposes virtually no restrictions on the ability to discriminate. We propose a simple rule - imitation perfection - that restricts discrimination significantly. It ensures that in every equilibrium bidders with the same value distribution and the same valuation earn the same expected surplus. If all bidders are homogeneous, revenue and social surplus optimal auctions which are consistent with imitation perfection exist. For heterogeneous bidders however, it is incompatible with revenue and social surplus optimization. Thus, a trade-off between non-discrimination and optimality exists.

中文翻译：

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模仿完美——防止采购歧视的简单规则

旨在遏制歧视的采购法规要求平等对待卖家。然而，Deb 和 Pai（2017 年）表明，此类监管几乎没有对歧视能力施加任何限制。我们提出了一个简单的规则 - 模仿完美 - 显着限制歧视。它确保在每个具有相同价值分布和相同估值的均衡投标人获得相同的预期盈余。如果所有投标人都是同质的，则存在与模仿完美相一致的收入和社会剩余最优拍卖。然而，对于异质投标者来说，它与收入和社会剩余优化不相容。因此，存在非歧视性和最优性之间的权衡。