In a market rush, the fear of future adverse price movements causes traders to trade before they become well informed, reducing the informational efficiency of the market. I derive theoretical conditions under which market rushes are equilibrium behavior and study how well these conditions organize trading behavior in a laboratory implementation of the model. Market rushes, including both panics and frenzies, occur more frequently when predicted by theory. However, subjects use commonly discussed, momentum-like strategies that lead to informational losses not predicted by theory, suggesting that these strategies may exacerbate both the occurrence and consequences of panics and frenzies.

中文翻译：

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市场恐慌、狂热和信息效率：理论与实验

在市场热潮中，对未来不利价格走势的恐惧导致交易者在他们充分了解情况之前进行交易，从而降低了市场的信息效率。我推导出了理论条件，在这些条件下，市场高峰是均衡行为，并在模型的实验室实施中研究这些条件如何组织交易行为。当按理论预测时，包括恐慌和狂热在内的市场热潮会更频繁地发生。然而，受试者使用普遍讨论的、类似动量的策略，这些策略会导致理论无法预测的信息损失，这表明这些策略可能会加剧恐慌和狂热的发生和后果。