Using data from the representative IAB Establishment Panel in Germany and estimating a heteroskedastic probit model with fixed effects, this paper finds a negative relationship between the existence of owner-management in an establishment and the probabilities of having a works council or a collective bargaining agreement. We show that family firms which are solely managed by the owners or by external executives significantly differ in the presence of these kinds of worker representation. The probabilities of having works councils and (company-level) collective agreements increase substantially if just some of the managers do not belong to the owner family. We argue that these differences cannot simply be attributed to an aversion of the owners against co-determination and unions but suggest taking account of the notion of socio-emotional wealth prevalent in family firms. In addition, our results support the idea that external managers mainly act as agents rather than stewards in family firms.

中文翻译：

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德国企业的所有者、外部经理和劳资关系

使用来自德国代表性的 IAB 机构小组的数据并估计具有固定效应的异方差概率模型，本文发现机构中所有者管理的存在与拥有工作委员会或集体谈判协议的概率之间存在负相关关系。我们表明，完全由所有者或外部高管管理的家族企业在这些工人代表的存在方面存在显着差异。如果只有一些经理不属于业主家庭，那么拥有劳资委员会和（公司层面）集体协议的可能性就会大大增加。我们认为，这些差异不能简单地归因于所有者对共同决定和工会的厌恶，而是建议考虑家族企业中普遍存在的社会情感财富概念。此外，我们的结果支持外部经理在家族企业中主要充当代理人而非管家的观点。