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Leveraging the European Refugee Crisis: Forced Displacement and Bargaining in Greece's Bailout Negotiations
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies ( IF 2.500 ) Pub Date : 2021-06-08 , DOI: 10.1111/jcms.13211
Gerasimos Tsourapas 1 , Sotirios Zartaloudis 2
Affiliation  

How does forced migration feature in EU member states' foreign policy and how does it affect their bargaining strategies? While the literature highlights EU-level policies aiming to manage forced migration flows, we examine how Greece sought to leverage its response to the 2015–16 European migrant crisis. We propose a theoretical framework that explains why the SYRIZA–ANEL government sought to leverage Greece's position as a refugee-host state via an issue​-linkage strategy tying the management of forced migration to economic aid over the Third Economic Adjustment Programme. Initially employing a ‘blackmailing’ strategy focused on threats, Greece shifted to a ‘backscratching’ strategy of co-operation after March 2016, once its geopolitical importance and numbers of asylum seekers within its territory were reduced. We provide the first detailed analysis of Greece's foreign policy response to the European migrant crisis, demonstrating the importance of forced displacement in the international politics of EU member states.

中文翻译:

利用欧洲难民危机:希腊救助谈判中的被迫流离失所和讨价还价

强迫移民在欧盟成员国的外交政策中有何特点,它如何影响他们的谈判策略?虽然文献强调了旨在管理强迫移民流动的欧盟层面的政策,但我们研究了希腊如何寻求利用其对 2015-16 年欧洲移民危机的反应。我们提出了一个理论框架,解释了为什么 SYRIZA-ANEL 政府试图通过将强制移民管理与第三次经济调整计划的经济援助联系起来的问题联系战略来利用希腊作为难民收容国的地位。希腊最初采用针对威胁的“敲诈”策略,在 2016 年 3 月之后,一旦其地缘政治重要性和其领土内的寻求庇护者数量减少,就转向了“后顾之忧”的合作策略。
更新日期:2021-06-08
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