Ridesharing (RS) has been modeled as a specific multimodal equilibrium where solo and RS vehicles have different travel cost structures. An extended network structure that incorporates three types of traffic flows (i.e., solo drivers, RS drivers, and RS riders) has been useful in RS related network design problems and policy making. However, the extended network structure did not model the matching cost between drivers and riders at each node explicitly, leading to unreasonable or undesirable phenomena. For instance, RS drivers may drop off passengers at one node, proceed to the next link, and then pick up passengers again. This frequent pick-up and drop-off phenomenon needs to be fixed before any efficient policies can be proposed. This paper aims to develop a two-layer extended network that allows to model nodal cost whenever a pickup or a drop-off happens. Search friction of drivers and waiting time of riders will be formulated as well. Accordingly, bi-level network design problems are formulated for congestion tolling and platform pricing. For congestion tolling, we apply a differential toll scheme and analyze its impact on optimal tolls. For platform pricing, we propose two objectives: maximization of social welfare and maximization of the platform revenue, and compare their impact on system performances. Numerical examples are then performed for congestion tolling and platform pricing on the Braess network and the Sioux Falls network, respectively.

拼车 (RS) 已被建模为一种特定的多模式均衡，其中单人和 RS 车辆具有不同的旅行成本结构。包含三种类型的交通流（即单人司机、RS 司机和 RS 乘客）的扩展网络结构在 RS 相关的网络设计问题和政策制定中很有用。然而，扩展的网络结构并没有明确地对每个节点的司机和乘客之间的匹配成本进行建模，从而导致不合理或不受欢迎的现象。例如，RS 司机可能会在一个节点下客，前往下一个链接，然后再次接载乘客。在提出任何有效的政策之前，需要解决这种频繁的起降现象。本文旨在开发一个两层扩展网络，允许在发生上车或下车时对节点成本进行建模。还将制定司机的搜索摩擦和乘客的等待时间。因此，为拥塞收费和平台定价制定了双层网络设计问题。对于拥堵收费，我们应用差异收费方案并分析其对最优通行费的影响。对于平台定价，我们提出两个目标：社会福利最大化和平台收益最大化，并比较它们对系统性能的影响。然后分别针对 Braess 网络和 Sioux Falls 网络上的拥堵收费和平台定价执行数值示例。为拥塞收费和平台定价制定了双层网络设计问题。对于拥堵收费，我们应用差异收费方案并分析其对最优通行费的影响。对于平台定价，我们提出两个目标：社会福利最大化和平台收益最大化，并比较它们对系统性能的影响。然后分别针对 Braess 网络和 Sioux Falls 网络上的拥堵收费和平台定价执行数值示例。为拥塞收费和平台定价制定了双层网络设计问题。对于拥堵收费，我们应用差异收费方案并分析其对最优通行费的影响。对于平台定价，我们提出两个目标：社会福利最大化和平台收益最大化，并比较它们对系统性能的影响。然后分别针对 Braess 网络和 Sioux Falls 网络上的拥堵收费和平台定价执行数值示例。