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Cooperation and competition between pair and multi-player social games in spatial populations
arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory Pub Date : 2021-06-08 , DOI: arxiv-2106.04436
Attila Szolnoki, Xiaojie Chen

The conflict between individual and collective interests is in the heart of every social dilemmas established by evolutionary game theory. We cannot avoid these conflicts but sometimes we may choose which interaction framework to use as a battlefield. For instance some people like to be part of a larger group while other persons prefer to interact in a more personalized, individual way. Both attitudes can be formulated via appropriately chosen traditional games. In particular, the prisoner's dilemma game is based on pair interaction while the public goods game represents multi-point interactions of group members. To reveal the possible advantage of a certain attitude we extend these models by allowing players not simply to change their strategies but also let them to vary their attitudes for a higher individual income. We show that both attitudes could be the winner at a specific parameter value. Interestingly, however, the subtle interplay between different states may result in a counterintuitive evolutionary outcome where the increase of the multiplication factor of public goods game drives the population to a fully defector state. We point out that the accompanying pattern formation can only be understood via the multipoint or multi-player interactions of different microscopic states where the vicinity of a particular state may influence the relation of two other competitors.

中文翻译:

空间种群中双人与多人社交游戏的合作与竞争

个人利益和集体利益之间的冲突是进化博弈论建立的每个社会困境的核心。我们无法避免这些冲突,但有时我们可能会选择使用哪个交互框架作为战场。例如,有些人喜欢成为更大群体的一部分,而其他人则更喜欢以更个性化、个性化的方式进行互动。Both attitudes can be formulated via appropriately chosen traditional games. 尤其是囚徒困境博弈是基于结对互动的,而公共物品博弈则代表群体成员的多点互动。为了揭示某种态度的可能优势,我们扩展了这些模型,让玩家不仅可以改变他们的策略,还可以让他们改变态度以获得更高的个人收入。我们表明,在特定参数值下,两种态度都可能是赢家。然而,有趣的是,不同状态之间微妙的相互作用可能会导致违反直觉的进化结果,即公共产品博弈倍增因子的增加将人口推向完全叛逃的状态。我们指出,伴随的模式形成只能通过不同微观状态的多点或多人交互来理解,其中特定状态的附近可能会影响其他两个竞争者的关系。不同状态之间微妙的相互作用可能会导致违反直觉的进化结果,即公共产品博弈倍增因子的增加将人口推向完全叛逃的状态。我们指出,伴随的模式形成只能通过不同微观状态的多点或多人交互来理解,其中特定状态的附近可能会影响其他两个竞争者的关系。不同状态之间微妙的相互作用可能会导致违反直觉的进化结果,即公共产品博弈倍增因子的增加将人口推向完全叛逃的状态。我们指出,伴随的模式形成只能通过不同微观状态的多点或多人交互来理解,其中特定状态的附近可能会影响其他两个竞争者的关系。
更新日期:2021-06-09
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