In this paper we investigate the optimal organization of staggered price increases in cartels. Staggered price increases impose a cost during cartel formation as the price leader initially loses sales. We show that for intermediate discount factors, staggered price increases can only be sustained when the increase is neither too small nor too large. When a cartel executes two consecutive price increases, the choice between using the same leader or alternating leadership depends on the initial price level in the industry. We also discuss the choice between simultaneous and staggered price increases with an exogenous antitrust detection function, the allocation of price leadership with cost asymmetry, and the effect of product differentiation on price staggering.

在本文中，我们研究了卡特尔中交错价格上涨的最佳组织。由于价格领先者最初失去销售额，因此交错的价格上涨会在卡特尔形成过程中产生成本。我们表明，对于中间折扣因素，只有在涨幅既不太小也不太大的情况下，交错的价格上涨才能持续。当卡特尔连续执行两次提价时，选择使用相同的领导者还是交替领导者取决于行业的初始价格水平。我们还讨论了具有外生反垄断检测功能的同步和交错价格上涨之间的选择、成本不对称的价格领先分配以及产品差异对价格交错的影响。