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Mechanism Design for Facility Location Problems: A Survey
arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory Pub Date : 2021-06-07 , DOI: arxiv-2106.03457
Hau Chan, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Bo Li, Minming Li, Chenhao Wang

The study of approximate mechanism design for facility location problems has been in the center of research at the intersection of artificial intelligence and economics for the last decades, largely due to its practical importance in various domains, such as social planning and clustering.At a high level, the goal is to design mechanisms to select a set of locations on which to build a set of facilities, aiming to optimize some social objective and ensure desirable properties based on the preferences of strategic agents, who might have incentives to misreport their private information such as their locations. This paper presents a comprehensive survey of the significant progress that has been made since the introduction of the problem, highlighting the different variants and methodologies, as well as the most interesting directions for future research.

中文翻译:

设施选址问题的机制设计:调查

在过去的几十年里,设施选址问题的近似机制设计研究一直是人工智能和经济学交叉领域的研究中心,这主要是因为它在社会规划和集群等各个领域的实际重要性。级别,目标是设计机制来选择一组位置来建造一组设施,旨在优化一些社会目标并确保基于战略代理人的偏好的理想财产,他们可能有动机误报他们的私人信息比如他们的位置。本文对自引入该问题以来取得的重大进展进行了全面调查,重点介绍了不同的变体和方法,
更新日期:2021-06-08
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