We analyze the institutional determinants of U.S. financial market regulation with a general model of the policy-making process in which legislators delegate authority to regulate financial risk at both the firm and systemic levels. The model explains changes in U.S. financial regulation leading up to the financial crisis. We test the predictions of the general model with a novel, comprehensive data set of financial regulatory laws enacted specifically between 1950 and 2009. The theoretical and empirical analysis finds that economic and political factors impact Congress’ decision to delegate regulatory authority to executive agencies, which in turn impacts the stringency of financial market regulation, and our estimation results indicate that political factors may have been stronger and resulted in inefficiencies.

我们用决策过程的一般模型分析美国金融市场监管的制度决定因素，在该模型中，立法者授权在公司和系统层面监管金融风险。该模型解释了导致金融危机的美国金融监管的变化。我们使用 1950 年至 2009 年间专门颁布的金融监管法律的新颖、全面的数据集来测试通用模型的预测。理论和实证分析发现，经济和政治因素影响国会将监管权力下放给执行机构的决定反过来影响金融市场监管的严格程度，我们的估计结果表明政治因素可能更强大并导致效率低下。