In a vertical chain in which two rivals invest before contracting with one of two competing suppliers, vertical integration can create hold-up problems for the rival. We develop an experiment to test this theoretical prediction in a setup in which suppliers can either pre-commit ex ante to being greedy or degrade ex post the input they provide to their customer. Our experimental results confirm that vertical integration creates hold-up problems. However, vertical integration also generates more departures from theory, which can be explained by bounded rationality and social preferences.

中文翻译：

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垂直整合是阻碍的来源：一项实验

在两个竞争对手在与两个竞争供应商之一签订合同之前进行投资的垂直链中，垂直整合可能会给竞争对手带来阻碍。我们开发了一个实验来测试在安装该理论预测，使供应商可以预先承诺事前到贪婪或降低事后他们提供给他们的客户输入。我们的实验结果证实，垂直整合会产生滞留问题。然而，垂直整合也产生了更多的理论偏离，这可以用有限理性和社会偏好来解释。