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Kant on Touch, Embodied Activity, and the Perception of Causal Force
Kant-Studien Pub Date : 2021-06-01 , DOI: 10.1515/kant-2021-0018
Rachel Siow Robertson 1
Affiliation  

In the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science , Kant claims that perception of force through touch is fundamental to our knowledge of substance in space. However, he also holds that perception cannot have modal content. Causation is a modal notion, so how can Kant allow perception of causal force? In response to this puzzle, I provide a new reading of Kant’s theory of touch. Touch does not involve perception of the necessity of a cause, but it does involve awareness of the activity of our body in relation to other bodies. Human embodied activity has a hitherto unrecognized central role in Kant’s accounts of empirical cognition of substance in space, the science of such a substance, and the irreducibility of its causal forces.

中文翻译:

康德论触觉、具身活动和因果力的感知

在自然科学的形而上学基础中,康德声称通过触觉感知力是我们了解空间物质的基础。然而,他也认为知觉不能有模态内容。因果关系是一个模态概念,那么康德如何允许感知因果力呢?为了回答这个难题,我提供了对康德触觉理论的新解读。触觉不涉及对原因必要性的感知,但确实涉及对我们身体相对于其他身体的活动的认识。在康德对空间物质的经验认知、这种物质的科学以及其因果力的不可还原性的描述中,人类具身活动具有迄今为止未被承认的核心作用。
更新日期:2021-06-08
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