Flood risk is a complex and transboundary issue that is expected to escalate with climate change and requires to be governed by collaborative networks of actors. Municipal administrations have been suggested to have a particularly important and challenging role in such governance. Although collaborative governance has attracted intense scientific attention, empirical studies generally focus either on the macro-level institutions per se, or on the meso-level interaction between organizations, without corresponding attention to the micro-level interactions between the individual actors constituting the organizations and reproducing the institutions. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of how flood risk is governed within municipal administrations, by studying how actors interact within them when implementing tightly coupled policies. The paper draws on comparative case study research of three Swedish municipal administrations (Lomma, Lund, and Staffanstorp). Data were collected through interviews with all 143 actors actively contributing to mitigating flood risk within the municipal administrations, and analyzed structurally and interpretatively using social network analysis and qualitative analysis. Although the Swedish legal framework consists of tightly coupled policies demanding coordination between the actors implementing them, there is a recurrent pattern of relative integration between actors implementing policies for planning and water and sewage, and substantial separation between them and actors implementing policy for risk and vulnerability. This cinderellic fragmentation generates a “problem of fit” between the legal framework and the collaborative networks implementing it, which undermines the effectiveness of flood risk mitigation in municipal administrations. It is not accidental but a consequence of a directional separation of institutionalization, where the more bottom-up and problem-oriented institutionalization of practices in planning and water and sewage, and the more top-down and compliance-oriented institutionalization of practices in risk and vulnerability pull the network of actors apart. I demonstrate how the mechanisms of increasing returns, commitments, and objectification may all operate simultaneously but to various degrees in different practices across any collaborative governance network. Hence, potentially undermining policy coherence, policy integration, and collaborative governance.

中文翻译：

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市政管理中洪水风险缓解管理中的紧耦合政策和松散耦合网络

洪水风险是一个复杂的跨界问题，预计会随着气候变化而升级，需要由参与者协作网络管理。有人建议市政当局在这种治理中发挥特别重要和具有挑战性的作用。尽管协同治理引起了科学界的强烈关注，但实证研究通常要么关注宏观层面的制度本身，要么关注组织之间的中观层面的互动，而没有相应地关注构成组织的个体行为者之间的微观层面的互动和再现机构。本文的目的是帮助理解市政当局如何管理洪水风险，通过研究参与者在实施紧密耦合的政策时如何在他们内部互动。本文借鉴了瑞典三个市政当局（洛马、隆德和斯塔凡斯托普）的比较案例研究研究。数据是通过对所有 143 名在市政当局内为减轻洪水风险做出积极贡献的参与者的访谈收集的，并使用社交网络分析和定性分析进行结构性和解释性分析。尽管瑞典的法律框架由紧密耦合的政策组成，要求执行者之间进行协调，但执行规划和水和污水处理政策的执行者之间经常出现相对整合的模式，并且他们与执行风险和脆弱性政策的执行者之间存在实质性分离. 这种灰烬般的碎片化在法律框架和实施它的协作网络之间产生了“匹配问题”，这削弱了市政管理部门减轻洪水风险的有效性。这不是偶然的，而是制度化方向分离的结果，其中规划和水和污水方面的实践更加自下而上和以问题为导向的制度化，以及风险和排污实践更加自上而下和以合规为导向的制度化。脆弱性将参与者网络分开。我展示了增加回报、承诺和客观化的机制如何在任何协作治理网络的不同实践中同时运行，但程度不同。因此，可能会破坏政策的一致性、政策整合、