The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) is frequently used by the US law enforcement authorities to prosecute both US and foreign firms for bribery in foreign host countries. Evidence increasingly shows that anti-bribery enforcement is associated with a reduction in foreign investment inflows to host countries associated with enforcement actions. The determinants of enforcement actions remain understudied, however. I argue that enforcement actions are often political in nature, operating as de-facto sanctions against targeted countries. FCPA prosecutions can thus be viewed as a tool of economic statecraft, designed to reduce foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to targeted states and enforce US foreign policy objectives. Using data on FCPA enforcement actions along with data on UN voting patterns, alliances, and US foreign aid, I find that FCPA enforcement actions are more likely to target firms that bribe in host countries with foreign policy preferences that diverge from the United States. This paper is among the first to empirically study the determinants of anti-bribery enforcement and to explicitly consider the political nature of FCPA prosecutions. These findings have broad implication for political economy research on foreign investment, economic statecraft, and corruption.

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其他方式的经济治国之道：反贿赂起诉的使用和滥用

美国执法当局经常使用《反海外腐败法》(FCPA) 来起诉美国和外国公司在外国东道国的贿赂行为。越来越多的证据表明，反贿赂执法与执法行动相关的流入东道国的外国投资减少有关。然而，执法行动的决定因素仍未得到充分研究。我认为，执法行动通常具有政治性质，是对目标国家的事实上的制裁。因此，FCPA 起诉可以被视为一种经济治国之道的工具，旨在减少流入目标国家的外国直接投资 (FDI) 流入并执行美国的外交政策目标。使用 FCPA 执法行动数据以及联合国投票模式、联盟和美国外援数据，我发现 FCPA 执法行动更有可能针对那些在外交政策偏好与美国不同的东道国进行贿赂的公司。本文是最早对反贿赂执法的决定因素进行实证研究并明确考虑 FCPA 起诉的政治性质的论文之一。这些发现对有关外国投资、经济治国方略和腐败的政治经济学研究具有广泛的意义。