In a highly controversial decision, the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) decided that the Public Sector Purchase Program (PSPP) of the European Central Bank (ECB) was ultra vires because it violated the principle of proportionality. The FCC took a procedural approach to proportionality, finding that the ECB had failed to substantiate its balancing assessment. Therefore, the Court considered itself unable to review whether PSPP was substantively proportionate, but announced that it might do so in a future case. The judgment raises the fundamental question of how courts should review monetary policy. The article begins by exploring the role of central banks between independence and accountability. Then, it analyzes, in three steps, what role the principle of proportionality should play in the realm of monetary policy. First, I argue that a traditional substantive balancing test as part of proportionality review is not applicable to monetary policy decisions and highlight the pitfalls of the FCC’s approach. Second, I claim that the imposed procedural “duty to substantiate” is not suitable to promote the democratic accountability of the ECB. Third, I contend that, therefore, the PSPP ruling creates an impetus for strengthening the ECB’s supranational accountability. I suggest that improving the monetary dialogue with the EU Parliament and establishing a comprehensive transparency regime for the ECB could further this goal. Ultimately, I propose that a narrow reading of the PSPP ruling could reconcile the current conflict between the FCC and the ECB and still provide a sufficient level of judicial accountability for the ECB’s monetary policy-making.

中文翻译：

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货币政策制定的比例性和程序

在一项极具争议的裁决中，德国联邦宪法法院 (FCC) 裁定欧洲中央银行 (ECB) 的公共部门购买计划 (PSPP) 越权，因为它违反了比例原则。FCC 对比例性采取了程序性方法，发现欧洲央行未能证实其平衡评估。因此，法院认为自己无法审查 PSPP 是否在实质上相称，但宣布它可能会在未来的案件中这样做。该判决提出了法院应如何审查货币政策的基本问题。本文首先探讨中央银行在独立性和问责制之间的作用。然后，分三个步骤分析了比例原则在货币政策领域应发挥的作用。第一的，我认为，作为比例审查一部分的传统实质性平衡测试不适用于货币政策决策，并强调了 FCC 方法的缺陷。其次，我认为强加的程序性“证实义务”不适合促进欧洲央行的民主问责制。第三，我认为，因此，PSPP 的裁决为加强欧洲央行的超国家责任创造了动力。我建议改善与欧盟议会的货币对话并为欧洲央行建立一个全面的透明度制度可以进一步实现这一目标。最后，我建议狭义地解读 PSPP 的裁决可以调和当前 FCC 和欧洲央行之间的冲突，并且仍然为欧洲央行的货币政策制定提供足够程度的司法问责。