ABSTRACT

Most philosophical discussions of psychopathy have centered around its significance in relation to empathy, moral cognition, or moral responsibility. However, related questions about the extent to which psychopaths are capable of exercising autonomous agency have remained underexplored. Two central conditions for autonomous agency that are highlighted by many existing accounts include (1) reasons-responsivity, and (2) authenticity. However, available evidence indicates that psychopaths are inadequately responsive to reasons in general and other-regarding reasons in particular, and also seem to lack a set of enduring concerns that might reveal which desires and attitudes are truly theirs. This leads them to behave impulsivity and to disregard the interests and concerns of others. Drawing from the enactivist approach in philosophy of mind and the notions of habit and affordance, I argue that both their prudential deficits and apparent moral failings are rooted, at a deeper level, in a lack of well-developed affective framing patterns and a corresponding disruption to selective attention.

摘要

大多数关于精神病的哲学讨论都集中在它与同理心、道德认知或道德责任相关的重要性上。然而，关于精神病患者能够在多大程度上行使自主权的相关问题仍未得到充分探索。许多现有账户强调的自治机构的两个核心条件包括（1）原因 - 响应性，以及（2）真实性。然而，现有证据表明，精神变态者对一般原因和特别是其他有关原因的反应不足，而且似乎缺乏一系列持久的担忧，这些担忧可能揭示哪些欲望和态度是真正属于他们的。这导致他们表现出冲动和无视他人的利益和关切。习惯和负担能力，我认为他们的谨慎缺陷和明显的道德缺陷在更深层次上都源于缺乏成熟的情感框架模式以及对选择性注意的相应破坏。