Financial analysts (‘sell side’) face incentives that result in biased information for investors (‘buy side’). We examine whether a feedback channel from investors to financial analysts (comparable to the broker vote system) reduces these biases and thereby enhances information efficiency. In a controlled experiment with a monetary payment structure, 344 graduate students assume roles as analysts or investors, with the analysts making earnings recommendations for the investors in the presence of biased incentives. Under the treatment condition, the investors provide feedback to the analysts. Consistent with the monetary incentives built into the broker vote system and psychological theories, the presence of this feedback: (i) reduces bias among analysts; and (ii) enhances investors’ critical evaluation of information. Given the informational benefits of investor feedback, we highlight an unintended consequence of the European Union’s decision to abolish indirect payments to analysts from 2018 onwards.

中文翻译：

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投资者反馈：对分析师偏见和投资者批判性评价的影响

金融分析师（“卖方”）面临导致投资者（“买方”）信息有偏差的诱因。我们研究了从投资者到金融分析师的反馈渠道（类似于经纪人投票系统）是否减少了这些偏见，从而提高了信息效率。在货币支付结构的对照实验中，344 名研究生担任分析师或投资者的角色，分析师在存在偏见激励的情况下为投资者提供收益建议。在处理条件下，投资者向分析师提供反馈。与经纪人投票系统和心理理论中内置的货币激励一致，这种反馈的存在：（i）减少分析师之间的偏见；(ii) 提高投资者对信息的批判性评价。