This article aims to advance the psychodynamic understanding of imagination failures by studying lessons learned in the US government’s public inquiry into September 11th, 2001 (9/11). Analyzing the findings of The 9/11 Report, I theorize that two forms of macro-level hubris—America’s “hubris of empire-building” and Al Qaeda’s “hubris-nemesis complex”—amalgamated in a uniquely generative manner leading to events on 9/11. Previous studies of public inquiries often demonstrate that inquiry reports are monological story-telling performances used to create sense-making narratives that function hegemonically to impose a simplified version of reality to assign blame and depoliticize events in order to facilitate closure after shocking events. In contrast, findings here suggest that by constructing a critical narrative, The 9/11 Report may serve as a new type of public inquiry report that invites learning about the complex factors that underpin crisis. The article concludes by identifying fruitful areas of future research and ways to theorize further about the collective psychodynamics of macro-level hubris and the psychodynamic factors that hinder learning and contribute to imagination failures.

本文旨在通过研究从美国政府 2001 年 9 月 11 日 (9/11) 的公开调查中吸取的教训，促进对想象失败的心理动力学理解。分析9/11 报告的调查结果，我的理论是两种形式的宏观傲慢——美国的“帝国建设的傲慢”和基地组织的“傲慢-克星情结”——以一种独特的生成方式融合在一起，导致了 9/11 的事件。以往对公众调查的研究往往表明，调查报告是一种单调的讲故事表演，用于创造有意义的叙事，其霸权作用是强加一个简化版的现实来指责和非政治化事件，以便在令人震惊的事件后结束。相比之下，这里的调查结果表明，通过构建一个批判性的叙述，9/11 报告可以作为一种新型的公共调查报告，邀请人们了解导致危机的复杂因素。文章最后确定了未来研究的富有成果的领域，以及进一步理论化宏观傲慢的集体心理动力学和阻碍学习和导致想象力失败的心理动力学因素的方法。