To remember or forget our acquaintances’ strategies can influence our decision-making significantly. In this paper, we explore the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game model with punishment and memory mechanism in the time-varying network. Our results show that a larger temptation gain T or a larger the number of connected edges of activated individuals m would result in the decrease of the final fraction of cooperators. However, with the increase of the maximum penalty cost, the maximum punishment intensity or the value of individual’s “memory factor”, players are more inclined to choose cooperative strategy. In addition, an effective way to promote the cooperation is to improve the social subsidy. Remarkably, only when the social subsidy is greater than the temptation gain, the density of cooperators could increase significantly. Interestingly, there is a linear relationship between the threshold of social subsidy and the temptation gain. The final results show that ones’ activity rates have no significant correlation with their strategies.

中文翻译：

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囚徒困境博弈中惩罚记忆机制如何影响合作出现

记住或忘记我们熟人的策略会显着影响我们的决策。在本文中，我们探索了时变网络中具有惩罚和记忆机制的进化囚徒困境（PD）博弈模型。我们的结果表明，更大的诱惑收益吨或更大的激活个体的连接边数米将导致最终合作者比例的减少。但随着最高惩罚成本、最高惩罚强度或个体“记忆因子”值的增加，玩家更倾向于选择合作策略。此外，促进合作的有效途径是提高社会补贴水平。值得注意的是，只有当社会补贴大于诱惑收益时，合作者的密度才会显着增加。有趣的是，社会补贴门槛与诱惑收益之间存在线性关系。最终结果表明，一个人的活动率与他们的策略没有显着相关性。