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On convexity in cooperative games with externalities
Economic Theory ( IF 1.423 ) Pub Date : 2021-06-04 , DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01371-8
J. M. Alonso-Meijide , M. Álvarez-Mozos , M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro , A. Jiménez-Losada

We introduce new notions of superadditivity and convexity for games with coalitional externalities. We show parallel results to the classic ones for transferable utility games without externalities. In superadditive games the grand coalition is the most efficient organization of agents. The convexity of a game is equivalent to having non decreasing contributions to larger embedded coalitions. We also see that convex games can only have negative externalities.



中文翻译:

具有外部性的合作博弈的凸性

我们为具有联盟外部性的博弈引入了超可加性和凸性的新概念。对于没有外部性的可转移实用游戏,我们展示了与经典游戏的平行结果。在超可加博弈中,大联盟是最有效的代理组织。博弈的凸性相当于对更大的嵌入式联盟的贡献不减少。我们还看到凸博弈只能具有负外部性。

更新日期:2021-06-05
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