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Pay-performance sensitivity and corporate governance mechanisms: evidence from Tunisia
Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting Pub Date : 2021-06-03 , DOI: 10.1108/jfra-06-2020-0152
Meriem Ghrab , Marjène Gana , Mejda Dakhlaoui

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to analyze the CEO compensation sensitivity to firm performance, termed as the pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) in the Tunisian context and to test the robustness of this relationship when corporate governance (CG) mechanisms are considered.

Design/methodology/approach

The consideration of past executive pay as one of the explanatory variables makes this estimation model a dynamic one. Furthermore, to avoid the problem of endogeneity, this study uses the system-GMM estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). For robustness check, this study aims to use a simultaneous equation approach (three-stage least squares [3SLS]) to estimate the link between performance and CEO pay with a set of CG mechanisms to control for possible simultaneous interdependencies.

Findings

Using a sample of 336 firm-years from Tunisia over the 2009–2015 periods, this study finds strong evidence that the pay-performance relationship is insignificant and negative, and it becomes more negative or remains insignificant after introducing CG mechanisms consistently with the managerial power approach. The findings are robust to the use of alternative performance measures. This study provides new empirical evidence that CEOs of Tunisian firms abuse extracting rents independently of firm performance.

Originality/value

This study contributes to the unexamined research on PPS in a frontier market. This study also shows the ineffectiveness of the Tunisian CG structure and thus recommends for the legislator to impose a mandatory CG guide.



中文翻译:

薪酬绩效敏感性和公司治理机制:来自突尼斯的证据

目的

本研究的目的是分析 CEO 薪酬对公司绩效的敏感性,在突尼斯背景下称为绩效薪酬敏感性 (PPS),并在考虑公司治理 (CG) 机制时测试这种关系的稳健性。

设计/方法/方法

将过去的高管薪酬作为解释变量之一的考虑使该估计模型成为动态模型。此外,为了避免内生性问题,本研究使用了由 Blundell 和 Bond (1998) 开发的 system-GMM 估计器。对于稳健性检查,本研究旨在使用联立方程方法(三阶段最小二乘法 [3SLS])通过一组 CG 机制来估计绩效和 CEO 薪酬之间的联系,以控制可能的同时相互依赖关系。

发现

本研究使用突尼斯 2009 年至 2015 年期间的 336 个公司年样本,发现强有力的证据表明薪酬与绩效关系是不显着和负的,并且在引入与管理权力一致的 CG 机制后变得更加负或仍然不显着方法。这些发现对于使用替代绩效衡量标准是稳健的。这项研究提供了新的经验证据,表明突尼斯公司的 CEO 滥用独立于公司业绩的租金。

原创性/价值

这项研究有助于在前沿市场对 PPS 进行未经审查的研究。该研究还显示了突尼斯 CG 结构的无效性,因此建议立法者强制实施 CG 指南。

更新日期:2021-06-03
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