ABSTRACT

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons provides a nuclear-armed state that joins the treaty with two options. One is to join after eliminating its weapons and nuclear-weapon program. Alternatively, the state can join the treaty while still possessing nuclear weapons. In this case it must eliminate its weapons in accordance with a time-bound plan approved by the state parties. This option, known as “join and disarm,” provides the disarming state with an opportunity to join the treaty immediately after making the decision to do so and to complete disarmament within a defined time frame. However, it also creates a challenge for the verification program, which has to find a way to protect proliferation-sensitive information about nuclear weapons. This article suggests a verification arrangement that does not require access to sensitive information during the weapons elimination process. This is achieved by containing nuclear weapons and all dismantlement activities in a dedicated segment of the nuclear complex of the disarming state. The only information the disarming state releases at the start of the process is the total amount of fissile materials placed in the segment. The dismantlement of weapons is verified by accounting for the fissile materials that are removed from the segment in unclassified forms.

摘要

《禁止核武器条约》为加入该条约的核武器国家提供了两种选择。一种是在消除其武器和核武器计划后加入。或者，该国可以在仍然拥有核武器的情况下加入条约。在这种情况下，它必须按照缔约国批准的有时限的计划销毁武器。这种被称为“加入和解除武装”的选项为解除武装的国家提供了在决定加入条约并在规定的时间范围内完成解除武装后立即加入条约的机会。然而，这也给核查计划带来了挑战，该计划必须找到一种方法来保护有关核武器的扩散敏感信息。本文提出了一种验证安排，在武器销毁过程中不需要访问敏感信息。这是通过将核武器和所有拆除活动限制在解除武装国家核综合体的专用部分来实现的。解除武装状态在该过程开始时发布的唯一信息是放置在该段中的裂变材料的总量。武器的拆除通过核算以非机密形式从该部分拆除的裂变材料进行核实。解除武装状态在该过程开始时发布的唯一信息是放置在该段中的裂变材料的总量。武器的拆除通过核算以非机密形式从该部分拆除的裂变材料进行核实。解除武装状态在该过程开始时发布的唯一信息是放置在该段中的裂变材料的总量。武器的拆除通过核算以非机密形式从该部分拆除的裂变材料进行核实。