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Efficient policy interventions in an epidemic
Journal of Public Economics ( IF 8.262 ) Pub Date : 2021-06-04 , DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104444
Alberto Bisin , Piero Gottardi

In the context of an epidemic, a society is forced to face a system of externalities in consumption and in production. Command economy interventions can support efficient allocations at the cost of severe information requirements. Competitive markets for infection rights (alternatively, Pigouvian taxes) can guarantee efficiency without requiring direct policy interventions on socio-economic activities. We demonstrate that this is the case also with moral hazard, when the infections cannot be associated to the specific activities which originated them. Finally, we extend the analysis to situations where governments have only incomplete information regarding the values of the parameters of the infection or of firms’ production.



中文翻译:

流行病中的有效政策干预

在流行病的背景下,一个社会被迫面对消费和生产的外部性系统。命令经济干预可以以严格的信息需求为代价支持有效的分配。感染权的竞争市场(或者庇古税)可以保证效率,而无需对社会经济活动进行直接的政策干预。我们证明了道德风险也是如此,当感染无法与引发它们的特定活动相关联时。最后,我们将分析扩展到政府只有关于感染参数或企业生产参数值的不完整信息的情况。

更新日期:2021-06-04
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