Sender costs of economic sanctions exacerbate the enforcement problem associated with multilateral coercive measures. When third-country sanctioners share strategic interests with the target state, they have commercial and diplomatic incentives to defect from multilateral sanctions arrangements. In addition to these well-documented sender costs, this article argues that migration pressure from the target state has become an important consideration for potential sanctioners. Economic sanctions often increase the economic distress on the target country, which in turn causes more people to migrate to countries where their co-ethnics reside. Countries hosting a large number of nationals from the target country face a disproportionately high level of migration pressure when sanctions increase emigration from the target country. Therefore, policymakers of these countries oppose economic sanctions on the target country as an attempt to preempt further migration. Analyzing the sanctions bills in the European Parliament from 2011 to 2015, we find empirical support for our prediction.

中文翻译：

---

移民与经济胁迫

经济制裁的发送者成本加剧了与多边强制措施相关的执法问题。当第三国制裁者与目标国共享战略利益时，他们有商业和外交动机脱离多边制裁安排。除了这些有据可查的发送者成本外，本文认为来自目标州的移民压力已成为潜在制裁者的重要考虑因素。经济制裁往往会增加目标国家的经济困境，进而导致更多人迁移到其同民族居住的国家。当制裁增加来自目标国家的移民时，接纳大量来自目标国家的国民的国家面临着不成比例的高水平移民压力。所以，这些国家的政策制定者反对对目标国家实施经济制裁，以阻止进一步的移民。分析 2011 年至 2015 年欧洲议会的制裁法案，我们发现经验支持我们的预测。