According to the Competing Claims View (CCV) we decide between alternatives by looking at the competing claims held by affected individuals. The strength of these claims is a function of two features: how much they stand to benefit (or lose) by each alternative, and how badly off they would be in its absence. The view can be, and is, endorsed by both egalitarians and prioritarians. For the former the second condition will concern looking at how badly off the person is relative to others, whereas for the latter it will be how badly off she is in absolute terms. In this paper I want to argue that neither should be endorsed. The egalitarian version of CCV breaks down when attempting to assess the competing claims of possible persons who may never exist. Also, the view, on at least one plausible interpretation, leads to intransitive judgements. The prioritarian version of CCV, in turn, is vulnerable to its own unique objection, namely delivering an anti-prioritarian and rather implausible verdict in certain Single Person Cases.

根据竞争索赔视图 (CCV)，我们通过查看受影响个人持有的竞争索赔来决定备选方案。这些主张的强度取决于两个特征：每种替代方案对它们的好处（或损失）程度，以及在没有替代方案的情况下它们的损失程度。这种观点可以而且正在得到平等主义者和优先主义者的认可。对于前者，第二个条件将涉及查看一个人相对于其他人的境况有多糟糕，而对于后者，则是她的绝对境遇有多糟糕。在本文中，我想论证两者都不应该被认可。当试图评估可能永远不存在的人的竞争主张时，CCV 的平等主义版本崩溃了。此外，这种观点，至少在一种似是而非的解释上，会导致不及物的判断。