This article develops a comparative institutionalist framework to investigate how pro-enforcement reforms leading to a change in competition policy regimes attracts FDI in host countries, and how this relationship is moderated by the interplay between key formal and informal institutions. We revisit the FDI theory by integrating insights from economics of competition policy and the most recent debate on how institutions matter to international business. We contend that the effectiveness of competition policy enforcement is a crucial factor in attracting FDI, but only in host countries characterized by institutional configurations where the lack of trust is concomitant with a high-quality regulatory institutional environment. Our analysis on a sample of 63 countries followed in the 1980–2017 period supports our hypotheses. This paper contributes to a deeper understanding on the competition policy–FDI relationship at national level and has implications for policy makers.

本文开发了一个比较制度主义框架，以研究导致竞争政策制度变化的促执法改革如何吸引东道国的 FDI，以及这种关系如何通过关键的正式和非正式机构之间的相互作用来缓和。我们通过整合竞争政策经济学的见解和最近关于制度对国际商业的重要性的辩论来重新审视 FDI 理论。我们认为，竞争政策执行的有效性是吸引 FDI 的关键因素，但仅限于以制度配置为特征的东道国，在这些国家中，缺乏信任与高质量的监管制度环境相伴。我们对 1980 年至 2017 年期间跟踪的 63 个国家的样本进行的分析支持了我们的假设。