The Stoics considered that in order to die well, one must previously have lived (well) and not merely existed, an assertion which will not be contested in this paper. The question raised here is whether an individual whose life expectancy is jeopardized by serious illness or whose life has not been lived to the ‘full’ for whatever reason should have to abandon all hope or, alternately, whether that life could still somehow be saved (in an ethical sense). One clear obstacle to achieving this stems from (bad) moral character, given that moral character is an element which conditions an individual’s moral behaviour, as pointed out by Beauchamp and Childress and particularly Pellegrino and Thomasma. The transformation of moral character requires time and effort but the testimonies of patients who have given their lives a radical new direction upon being diagnosed with a serious illness seem to show the existence of a peculiar phenomenon of moral catharsis. In this paper we attempt to illustrate that this alleged phenomenon is not the result of a kind of cataleptic impression but rather the result of a dialectic and narrative process, during which a first hope of healing is dashed, unveiling a new sense in the illness. Its fulfillment provides the patient with a final hope.

斯多葛学派认为，要想死得好，一个人必须以前活过（好），而不仅仅是存在，这一论断不会在本文中提出异议。这里提出的问题是，一个人的预期寿命因严重疾病而受到威胁，或者由于任何原因而没有过上“充实”的生活，是否应该放弃所有希望，或者，是否仍然可以以某种方式挽救生命（在道德意义上）。实现这一目标的一个明显障碍源于（坏的）道德品质，因为正如 Beauchamp 和 Childress，特别是 Pellegrino 和 Thomasma 所指出的，道德品质是影响个人道德行为的一个因素。品德的转变需要时间和精力，但从被确诊为大病而彻底改变生活方向的患者的证词中，似乎显示出一种奇特的道德宣泄现象。在本文中，我们试图说明这种所谓的现象不是一种僵硬印象的结果，而是一种辩证和叙述过程的结果，在此过程中，治愈的第一个希望破灭，揭示了疾病的新意义。它的实现为患者提供了最后的希望。在本文中，我们试图说明这种所谓的现象不是一种僵硬印象的结果，而是一种辩证和叙述过程的结果，在此过程中，治愈的第一个希望破灭，揭示了疾病的新意义。它的实现为患者提供了最后的希望。在本文中，我们试图说明这种所谓的现象不是一种僵硬印象的结果，而是一种辩证和叙述过程的结果，在此过程中，治愈的第一个希望破灭，揭示了疾病的新意义。它的实现为患者提供了最后的希望。