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Co-evolutionary game of manufacturers’ abatement behavior under carbon tax-subsidy policy
International Journal of Low-Carbon Technologies ( IF 2.3 ) Pub Date : 2021-06-02 , DOI: 10.1093/ijlct/ctaa081
Suyong Zhang 1, 2 , Chuanxu Wang 3 , Panos M Pardalos 2
Affiliation  

Abstract
In the context of carbon tax-subsidy policy, our paper develops the models of the tripartite evolutionary game between consumers, manufacturers and local governments and analyzes the impacts of carbon tax-subsidy policy on the strategies of consumers, manufacturers and local governments. Through the construction of replicated dynamic equations, we get the evolutionary stable strategy. Then, the numerical analysis is performed with system dynamics simulation. The results show that (i) the local governments should strengthen the consumers’ awareness of environmental protection through higher financial subsidies, (ii) the taxation intensity coefficient accelerates the dynamic system to evolve into a stable state and (iii) an appropriate punishment by the government accelerates the dynamic system to evolve into a stable state. Our research is expected to provide a reference for local governments to implement effective carbon tax-subsidy policy on manufacturers.


中文翻译:

碳税补贴政策下厂商减排行为的协同演化博弈

摘要
在碳税补贴政策的背景下,本文建立了消费者、制造商和地方政府三方演化博弈模型,分析了碳税补贴政策对消费者、制造商和地方政府战略的影响。通过构造重复的动力学方程,我们得到了进化稳定策略。然后,通过系统动力学仿真进行数值分析。结果表明:(i)地方政府应通过提高财政补贴来增强消费者的环保意识;(ii)税收强度系数加速动态系统向稳定状态的演变;(iii)适当的惩罚措施。政府加速动态系统向稳定状态演化。
更新日期:2021-06-02
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