We study cooperative solutions for differential games where players consume a common property resource. Players are asymmetric, in the sense that they have different preferences and, in particular, different time preferences. We propose a new time-consistent dynamic bargaining procedure for this class of games. This solution concept, which is defined as the time-consistent dynamic bargaining (TCB) solution, extends the recursive Nash bargaining solution introduced in Sorger (J Econ Dyn Control 30:2637–2659, 2006) to a continuous time setting. The underlying idea is that, in case of disagreement, the threat is that players will play a noncooperative Markov Perfect Nash equilibrium just during a very small period of time, since new negotiations can take place at every future moment and, in particular, immediately later. Conditions for interior TCB solutions are derived. To illustrate the results, two common property resource games are analyzed in detail.

我们研究了玩家消耗公共财产资源的差分游戏的合作解决方案。玩家是不对称的，因为他们有不同的偏好，尤其是不同的时间偏好。我们为此类博弈提出了一种新的时间一致动态讨价还价程序。该解决方案概念被定义为时间一致动态讨价还价 (TCB) 解决方案，将 Sorger (J Econ Dyn Control 30:2637–​​2659, 2006) 中引入的递归纳什讨价还价解决方案扩展到连续时间设置。潜在的想法是，在出现分歧的情况下，威胁是参与者将在非常短的时间内发挥非合作的马尔可夫完美纳什均衡，因为新的谈判可能会在未来的每个时刻发生，特别是在紧随其后. 推导出内部 TCB 解决方案的条件。为了说明结果，详细分析了两种常见的财产资源博弈。