We investigate the effect of bureaucratic corruption on economic development when women are discriminated against in the labor market. The analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which capital accumulation drives economic development. The government appoints bureaucrats to administer public policy. Corruption arises due to the opportunity for bureaucrats to embezzle public funds. In the event of detection and dismissal, the private sector serves as the bureaucrats' outside option. Our main results can be summarized as follows: first, when the public sector is a more gender-equal employer than the private sector, female bureaucrats are less corrupt than male; second, corruption and development are jointly determined allowing the possibility of a poverty trap; and third, a policy to increase female participation in the public sector potentially reduces corruption and fosters economic development.

中文翻译：

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性别不平等、腐败和经济发展

我们调查了当女性在劳动力市场上受到歧视时官僚腐败对经济​​发展的影响。该分析基于一个动态的一般均衡模型，在该模型中，资本积累推动经济发展。政府任命官僚来管理公共政策。腐败是由于官僚贪污公款的机会而产生的。在被发现和解雇的情况下，私营部门将成为官僚的外部选择。我们的主要结果可以总结如下：第一，当公共部门是比私营部门更性别平等的雇主时，女性官僚的腐败程度低于男性；第二，腐败和发展共同决定了贫困陷阱的可能性；第三，