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Banks’ Sovereign Exposures: In Search of New Rules
Journal of Financial Regulation Pub Date : 2021-02-08 , DOI: 10.1093/jfr/fjab002
Angelo Baglioni 1 , Francesco Cefalà 2
Affiliation  

In this article, we examine the reform of the prudential treatment of banks’ sovereign exposures with the purpose of introducing risk-sensitive capital charges and limiting home bias. We consider six different options and measure their impact on the common equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio of 82 banks fom 10 euro-area countries, participating in the 2019 European Banking Authority EU-wide transparency exercise and subject to European Central Bank supervision. Our evidence shows that the proposal put forward by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in 2017 is the proposal which leads to the most evenly distributed impact across countries, in terms of CET1 ratio decline. That proposal targets the goals of risk sensitivity and diversification, with two independent instruments: rating-based risk weights and concentration add-ons. As a consequence, it is the only proposal which introduces an incentive for banks located in all countries, whether low rated or high rated, to reduce their home bias. Some proposals focus on one objective only: either risk sensitivity or diversification. Others introduce heavy penalization for banks located in low-rated countries, without addressing the home bias of banks located in high-rated countries. Several options are prone to pro-cyclicality, and we measure this effect by simulating the impact of a two-notch downgrading of high debt countries on the CET1 ratio of banks. Some relevant cross-country effects emerge from our analysis, due to the large cross-country exposures of a few intermediaries.

中文翻译:

银行的主权风险敞口:寻求新规则

在本文中,我们研究了银行主权风险敞口审慎处理的改革,目的是引入风险敏感的资本要求并限制本国偏差。我们考虑了六种不同的选择,并衡量了它们对来自 10 个欧元区国家的 82 家银行的普通股一级 (CET1) 比率的影响,这些银行参与了 2019 年欧洲银行管理局在欧盟范围内的透明度活动,并受到欧洲中央银行的监督。我们的证据表明,巴塞尔银行监管委员会在 2017 年提出的提案是在 CET1 比率下降方面导致各国影响分布最均匀的提案。该提案针对风险敏感性和多样化的目标,使用了两个独立的工具:基于评级的风险权重和集中度附加项。作为结果,这是唯一一项鼓励所有国家的银行(无论是低评级还是高评级)减少本国偏见的提案。一些建议只关注一个目标:风险敏感性或多样化。其他人则对位于低评级国家的银行实施严厉处罚,而没有解决位于高评级国家的银行的本土偏见。有几个选项容易出现顺周期性,我们通过模拟高债务国家降级两档对银行 CET1 比率的影响来衡量这种影响。由于少数中介机构的跨国风险敞口较大,我们的分析中出现了一些相关的跨国效应。一些建议只关注一个目标:风险敏感性或多样化。其他人则对位于低评级国家的银行实施严厉处罚,而没有解决位于高评级国家的银行的本土偏见。有几个选项容易出现顺周期性,我们通过模拟高债务国家降级两档对银行 CET1 比率的影响来衡量这种影响。由于少数中介机构的跨国风险敞口较大,我们的分析中出现了一些相关的跨国效应。一些建议只关注一个目标:风险敏感性或多样化。其他人则对位于低评级国家的银行实施严厉处罚,而没有解决位于高评级国家的银行的本土偏见。有几个选项容易出现顺周期性,我们通过模拟高债务国家降级两档对银行 CET1 比率的影响来衡量这种影响。由于少数中介机构的跨国风险敞口较大,我们的分析中出现了一些相关的跨国效应。我们通过模拟高债务国家降级两级对银行 CET1 比率的影响来衡量这种影响。由于少数中介机构的跨国风险敞口较大,我们的分析中出现了一些相关的跨国效应。我们通过模拟高债务国家降级两级对银行 CET1 比率的影响来衡量这种影响。由于少数中介机构的跨国风险敞口较大,我们的分析中出现了一些相关的跨国效应。
更新日期:2021-02-08
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