As a large cocoa bean trader, Transmar group ltd. bought millions of dollars’ worth of beans relying on financing from a syndicate of banks. To monitor amounts of eligible collateral, the banks required Transmar prepare periodic borrowing base (BB) reports. At some point, Transmar developed a discrepancy in collateral recorded on the BB report versus the amount of funds borrowed. The case discusses how this discrepancy grew larger as many questionable and fraudulent entries were included on subsequent BB reports. The case is written from the perspective of Peter B. Johnson, head of Transmar’s European affiliate and son of CEO and founder of Transmar, Peter G. Johnson. In late 2014, Peter B. Johnson first learned about the deceptive practices being employed in preparing the BB reports. How will he react? The case is also rich in details surrounding the cocoa industry supply chain and history of cocoa production.

中文翻译：

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Transmar Cocoa 的垮台

作为大型可可豆贸易商，Transmar 集团有限公司。依靠银行财团的融资购买了价值数百万美元的咖啡豆。为了监控合格抵押品的数量，银行要求 Transmar 准备定期借款基础 (BB) 报告。在某些时候，Transmar 发现 BB 报告中记录的抵押品与借入的资金量存在差异。该案例讨论了这种差异如何变得更大，因为随后的 BB 报告中包含了许多有问题和欺诈性的条目。该案例是从 Transmar 欧洲分支机构负责人、Transmar 首席执行官兼创始人 Peter G. Johnson 之子 Peter B. Johnson 的角度撰写的。2014 年底，Peter B. Johnson 首次了解到在准备 BB 报告时采用的欺骗性做法。他会如何反应？该案例还详细介绍了可可产业供应链和可可生产历史。