当前位置: X-MOL 学术Auton. Agent. Multi-Agent Syst. › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
Information Design in Affiliate Marketing
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems ( IF 1.9 ) Pub Date : 2021-05-31 , DOI: 10.1007/s10458-021-09509-7
Sharadhi Alape Suryanarayana , David Sarne , Sarit Kraus

The recent massive proliferation of affiliate marketing suggests a new e-commerce paradigm which involves sellers, affiliates and the platforms that connect them. In particular, the fact that prospective buyers may become acquainted with the promotion through more than one affiliate to whom they are connected calls for new mechanisms for compensating affiliates for their promotional efforts. In this paper, we study the problem of a platform that needs to decide on the commission to be awarded to affiliates for promoting a given product or service. Our equilibrium-based analysis, which applies to the case where affiliates are a priori homogeneous and self-interested, enables showing that a minor change in the way the platform discloses information to the affiliates results in a tremendous (positive) effect on the platform’s expected profit. In particular, we show that with the revised mechanism the platform can overcome the multi-equilibria problem that arises in the traditional mechanism and obtain a profit which is at least as high as the maximum profit in any of the equilibria that hold in the latter.



中文翻译:

联盟营销中的信息设计

最近联属网络营销的大规模扩散表明了一种新的电子商务范式,其中涉及卖家、联属网络营销和连接它们的平台。尤其是,潜在购买者可能通过与他们有联系的不止一个附属机构而熟悉促销活动的事实需要新的机制来补偿附属机构的促销努力。在本文中,我们研究了一个平台的问题,该平台需要决定为推广特定产品或服务而授予附属公司的佣金。我们基于均衡的分析适用于附属公司是先验同质和自利的情况,能够表明平台向附属公司披露信息的方式的微小变化会对平台的预期产生巨大(积极)的影响利润。

更新日期:2021-05-31
down
wechat
bug