This paper studies the causes and duration of conflicts with a war of attrition game featuring overconfident players. We find that overconfidence is neither necessary, nor sufficient to have conflict. Overconfident decision makers are nevertheless more likely to initiate conflict, and to also remain active longer in a conflict. Our main results are that (i) the degree of overconfidence and conflict duration may have an inverted U-shaped relationship, and (ii) the outcome of the war of attrition may be in favor of a weaker, yet overconfident player. We argue that this simple model helps understanding a host of real-world conflictive situations.

中文翻译：

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过度自信和冲突

本文研究了以过度自信的玩家为特征的消耗战游戏冲突的原因和持续时间。我们发现过度自信既没有必要，也不足以产生冲突。然而，过度自信的决策者更有可能引发冲突，并在冲突中保持更长时间的活跃。我们的主要结果是 (i) 过度自信的程度和冲突持续时间可能呈倒 U 形关系，以及 (ii) 消耗战的结果可能有利于较弱但过于自信的玩家。我们认为这个简单的模型有助于理解许多现实世界的冲突情况。