Abstract

All colonial powers granted concessions to private companies to extract natural resources during the colonial era. Within Africa, these concessions were characterized by indirect rule and violence. We use the arbitrarily defined borders of rubber concessions granted in the north of the Congo Free State to examine the causal effects of this form of economic organization on development. We find that historical exposure to the concessions causes significantly worse education, wealth, and health outcomes. To examine mechanisms, we collect survey and experimental data from individuals near a former concession boundary. We find that village chiefs inside the former concessions provide fewer public goods, are less likely to be elected, and are more likely to be hereditary. However, individuals within the concessions are more trusting, more cohesive, and more supportive of sharing income. We interpret our results as reflecting how institutions and culture may act as substitutes in the context of the widespread colonial concession system.

中文翻译：

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让步、暴力和间接统治：来自刚果自由邦的证据*

摘要

在殖民时代，所有殖民国家都授予私营公司开采自然资源的特许权。在非洲，这些让步的特点是间接统治和暴力。我们使用在刚果自由州北部授予的橡胶特许权的任意定义边界来研究这种经济组织形式对发展的因果影响。我们发现，历史上对特许权的接触会导致教育、财富和健康结果显着恶化。为了检查机制，我们从前特许边界附近的个人收集调查和实验数据。We find that village chiefs inside the former concessions provide fewer public goods, are less likely to be elected, and are more likely to be hereditary. 然而，特许区内的个人更信任，更有凝聚力，并且更支持分享收入。我们将我们的结果解释为反映了制度和文化如何在广泛的殖民特许制度的背景下充当替代品。