We compare outcomes of the common identical-item auction formats in an independent private value environment. In single-unit demand cases, discriminatory auctions, uniform-price auctions, sequential auctions with disclosing only the winner’s identity, and sequential auctions with disclosing both the winner’s identity and winning price, are revenue equivalent. The seller’s expected revenue is the lowest in sequential auctions with disclosing all bids due to bidders’ faking behaviors. In multi-unit demand cases, discriminatory auctions generate the highest revenue, followed by sequential auctions with three different information disclosure rules. The seller’s revenue varies from the highest to the lowest in uniform-price auctions owing to the existence of multiple equilibria. Interestingly, we find that with more information disclosed, a bidder’s expected payoff may increase, decrease, or even stay unchanged, which is different from the conventional wisdom “the more information, the better”.

我们在独立的私人价值环境中比较了常见的相同物品拍卖格式的结果。在单一单位需求的情况下，歧视性拍卖、统一价格拍卖、仅披露获胜者身份的顺序拍卖以及同时披露获胜者身份和获胜价格的顺序拍卖是收入等价的。由于投标人的造假行为，卖方的预期收入是连续拍卖中最低的，披露了所有投标。在多单位需求的情况下，歧视性拍卖产生的收入最高，其次是具有三种不同信息披露规则的顺序拍卖。由于存在多重均衡，卖方的收入在统一价格拍卖中从最高到最低不等。有趣的是，我们发现随着更多信息的披露，