Wellbeing describes how good life is for the person living it. Wellbeing comes in degrees. Subjective theories of wellbeing maintain that for objects or states of affairs to benefit us, we need to have a positive attitude towards these objects or states of affairs: the Resonance Constraint. In this article, we investigate to what extent subjectivism can plausibly account for degrees of wellbeing. There is a vast literature on whether preference-satisfaction theory – one particular subjective theory – can account for degrees of wellbeing. This is generally taken to be problematic. However, other subjective theories – namely, desire-satisfaction, judgment- and value-fulfillment theories – do not suffer from the same difficulties. We introduce two models of degrees of wellbeing a subjectivist can employ: the Relative and the Absolute Model, and defend the claim that both models face difficulties. In particular, we argue that a subjectivist theory should describe instances of depression as instances of low degrees of wellbeing. We also argue that a reduction of desires may sometimes improve one’s degree of wellbeing, an idea we call the Epicurean Intuition. We then argue that the Relative Model fails to account for the disbenefit of certain types of depression, while the Absolute Model fails to meet a central commitment of subjectivism – the Resonance Constraint – and is unable to accommodate the Epicurean Intuition. The upshot of the paper is that subjectivist theories cannot account for degrees of well-being in a plausible way.

幸福感描述了生活在其中的人的美好生活。幸福是有度数的。健康的主观理论认为，要使事物或事物状态有益于我们，我们需要对这些事物或事物状态持积极态度：共鸣约束。在本文中，我们调查主观主义在多大程度上可以合理地解释幸福程度。关于偏好满足理论——一种特殊的主观理论——是否可以解释幸福程度，有大量文献。这通常被认为是有问题的。然而，其他主观理论——即欲望满足理论、判断理论和价值实现理论——并没有遇到同样的困难。我们介绍了主观主义者可以采用的两种幸福程度模型：相对模型和绝对模型，并为两种模型都面临困难的说法辩护。特别是，我们认为主观主义理论应该将抑郁症的情况描述为幸福感较低的情况。我们还认为，减少欲望有时可能会改善一个人的幸福程度，我们称之为伊壁鸠鲁直觉。然后，我们认为相对模型未能解释某些类型抑郁症的不利影响，而绝对模型未能满足主观主义的核心承诺——共振约束——并且无法适应伊壁鸠鲁的直觉。该论文的结论是主观主义理论无法以合理的方式解释幸福程度。我们认为主观主义理论应该将抑郁症的情况描述为幸福感较低的情况。我们还认为，减少欲望有时可能会改善一个人的幸福感，这就是我们所说的伊壁鸠鲁直觉。然后，我们认为相对模型不能解决某些类型的抑郁症的弊端，而绝对模型不能满足主观主义的核心承诺-共鸣约束-并且不能适应伊壁鸠鲁的直觉。该论文的结论是主观主义理论无法以合理的方式解释幸福程度。我们认为主观主义理论应该将抑郁症的情况描述为幸福感较低的情况。我们还认为，减少欲望有时可能会改善一个人的幸福程度，我们称之为伊壁鸠鲁直觉。然后，我们认为相对模型未能解释某些类型抑郁症的不利影响，而绝对模型未能满足主观主义的核心承诺——共振约束——并且无法适应伊壁鸠鲁的直觉。该论文的结论是主观主义理论无法以合理的方式解释幸福程度。然后，我们认为相对模型未能解释某些类型抑郁症的不利影响，而绝对模型未能满足主观主义的核心承诺——共振约束——并且无法适应伊壁鸠鲁的直觉。该论文的结论是主观主义理论无法以合理的方式解释幸福程度。然后，我们认为相对模型未能解释某些类型抑郁症的不利影响，而绝对模型未能满足主观主义的核心承诺——共振约束——并且无法适应伊壁鸠鲁的直觉。该论文的结论是主观主义理论无法以合理的方式解释幸福程度。