Taxonomies of the passions have long claimed to serve a quest for self-knowledge, by specifying conditions under which certain passions arise, formal objects they possess, and qualities essential to their particular feelings. I argue that David Hume's theory of the passions provides resources for a different kind of self-knowledge – a sceptical self-knowledge depending on our ability to articulate how the passions feel rather than always identifying our passions as tokens of an identifiable passion-type. These resources are distinctions between four qualitative aspects that passions may possess – pleasantness or painfulness, calmness or violence, invigoration or softening, and directedness or lack thereof towards specific actions. Reflection on these aspects produces a more accurate understanding of the nature of our emotions and chastens our judgmental tendencies in ways that benefit both self and others.

中文翻译：

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自我认识与休谟的激情现象学

长期以来，激情的分类法一直声称通过指定某些激情产生的条件、它们所拥有的形式对象以及对它们的特定感受必不可少的品质来服务于对自我认识的追求。我认为大卫休谟的激情理论为不同类型的自我认识提供了资源——一种怀疑的自我认识，取决于我们表达激情感受的能力，而不是总是将我们的激情识别为可识别的激情类型的标志。这些资源是激情可能拥有的四个质量方面的区别——愉快或痛苦、平静或暴力、活力或软化，以及对特定行为的定向或缺乏定向。