We find that following options listings, U.S. firms enjoy an average 17 bps interest reduction in new bank loans. These savings are greater among more opaque borrowers, which provides support for the information production channel. This effect is, however, absent when the options market is illiquid or highly active. Consistent with risk-shifting, borrowers with more active options markets pay higher spreads. Post-options loans carry higher spreads than pre-options loans when managers exhibit stronger risk-shifting incentives. Options listings lead to shorter (longer) loan maturities for unrated (investment-grade) borrowers, while the influence on collateral and covenant restrictions is consistent with both channels.

我们发现，在期权上市后，美国公司的新银行贷款平均减息 17 个基点。这些节省在更不透明的借款人中更大，这为信息生产渠道提供了支持。然而，当期权市场缺乏流动性或高度活跃时，这种影响就不存在了。与风险转移一致，拥有更活跃期权市场的借款人支付更高的利差。当管理者表现出更强的风险转移动机时，期权后贷款的利差高于期权前贷款。期权上市导致未评级（投资级）借款人的贷款期限更短（更长），而对抵押品和契约限制的影响与这两个渠道一致。