Why is it that even strong formal theories of truth fail to prove their own consistency? Although Field (Mind, 115, 459, 2006) has addressed this question for many theories of truth, I argue that there is an important and attractive class of theories of truth that he omitted in his analysis. Such theories cannot prove that all their axioms are true, though unlike many of the cases Field considers, they do not prove that any of their axioms are false or that any of their rules of inference are not truth preserving. I argue that it is the fact that such theories are not finitely axiomatizable that stops them from proving their own consistency.

为什么即使是强有力的形式真理理论也无法证明其自身的一致性？尽管Field（Mind， 115，459，2006）针对许多真理理论解决了这个问题，但我认为，他在分析中遗漏了一类重要且引人入胜的真理理论。这些理论不能证明其所有公理都是真实的，尽管与菲尔德所考虑的许多情况不同，它们并未证明其任何公理都是错误的，或者它们的任何推论规则都不是真理。我认为，正是这些理论不能完全公理化的事实阻止了它们证明自己的一致性。