We introduce a neighborhood structure in a waiting game, where the payoff of stopping increases when neighbors stop. We show that the dynamic evolution of the network can take the form of either a shrinking network, where players at the edges stop first, or a fragmenting network where interior players do. In addition to the coordination inefficiency standard in waiting games, the neighborhood structure gives rise to an additional inefficiency linked to the order in which players stop. We discuss an application to technology adoption in networks.

中文翻译：

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等待我的邻居

我们在等待博弈中引入了邻域结构，其中当邻居停止时停止的收益增加。我们表明，网络的动态演化可以采用收缩网络的形式，边缘的参与者首先停止，或者内部参与者停止的碎片化网络。除了等待游戏中的协调低效标准外，邻里结构还会导致与玩家停止顺序相关的额外低效。我们讨论了在网络中采用技术的应用。